

Ideological Diversity Will Improve Psychological Science

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Abstract

Psychologists are overwhelmingly liberal in their ideological sympathies. This skewness of the ideological distribution appears to be driven by a mix of self-selection, hostile-workplace processes, and direct discrimination. Drawing on work on diversity, opinion aggregation, biased assimilation, confirmation biases, and minority influence, this article identifies grounds for hypothesizing that ideological homogeneity poses a systemic threat to the validity of knowledge claims in psychology in general, and social psychology in particular. This article also identifies specific research programs that fail the turnabout test of ideological biases, which asks: how would the field react to ideological- mirror-image research programs that relied on the same standards of evidence and proof? Ideological values shape research-topic choices, literature review and citation practices, data interpretation, and construct labeling—and are especially problematic in light of recent evidence of “false-positive-error-rate inflation” and other fraying of Mertonian norms of science.

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“He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that.”

–John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (1859)

When Justice John Paul Stevens retired from the U.S. Supreme Court in 2009 and was replaced by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, there were no longer any Protestants on the bench. Many commentators took note, but few thought that the court’s wisdom would be compromised by the absence of a Protestant, even though the majority of Americans are Protestants. But what if Justice Ginsburg—the only woman—had retired first? Would there have been pressure on President Obama to appoint a woman to replace her? If so, why?

There are two major classes of justification for ensuring that at least one member of the Supreme Court is a woman – moral and functional. Moral arguments center on justice or fairness, and focus on how women have been excluded or marginalized either by the court or by society. Functional arguments, by contrast, focus on the performance of the Court itself: would gender diversity improve the quality of the Court’s deliberations and the wisdom of its decisions? The different intellectual perspectives that flow from gender diversity functionally improve the Supreme Court. Without female justices, the court would operate with a notable blind spot. For example, on some of the most contentious topics the court faces—such as family law, reproductive rights, and discrimination cases of all sorts—female justices could well have different intuitions and values from their male colleagues, that would lead them to ask different questions, weigh evidence differently, and select different cases for the court to hear.

But is gender diversity the most important kind of diversity, from a functional perspective? Imagine instead that all nine justices were conservative men, and one seat opened up. Would it be more valuable to nominate a liberal man or a conservative woman? Which kind of diversity would bring the greatest benefits for the quality of deliberation and jurisprudence?

In this article, we argue that *ideological diversity improves the performance of intellectual communities*. This includes small deliberative bodies such as the Supreme Court, and also larger communities of inquiry such as the one in which we—the six authors of this article—work: social and personality psychology. Redding (2001) addressed this issue with respect to psychology overall. Here we focus on social and personality psychology, but most of our concerns apply to other areas of psychology that deal with ideologically controversial topics, such as clinical and developmental psychology. We show that the need to take corrective action is even greater than it was when Redding (2001) published his critique. The ideological skew has gotten stronger (Gross & Simmons, 2007; McClintock, Spaulding, & Turner, 1965, p. 212; Rothman & Lichter, 2008) as has the evidence that social psychology discriminates against non-liberals (Inbar & Lammers, 2012). These trends are co-occurring with a rising skepticism about the methods used by the field (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), and the susceptibility of these methods to the biases and desires of the researchers (Yong, 2012). And they are co-

occurring with a rising reluctance in the U. S. Congress to support academic disciplines that are perceived to be ideologically biased. (APA, 2013)

In the first section of this article we review evidence on when and why diversity improves the quality of thinking and creativity in groups. Given the value of having a broad range of perspectives informing research questions, research design, and interpretation of studies, the second section examines whether psychology (and social psychology in particular) currently has the ideological diversity that would maximize the quality and reach of its research. We show that psychology once had some ideological diversity, but the trend over the last four decades has been towards ideological uniformity.

In the third section we examine five possible sources of the current state of ideological homogeneity in psychology: differences in ability, differences in interest, lack of appeal of a field seemingly devoted to liberals and liberal causes, hostile environment for nonliberals, and discrimination against non-liberals. We find evidence for all five hypotheses. They are mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive.

Regardless of whether the current state of ideological homogeneity in psychology is attributed to relatively benevolent versus malevolent factors, we then make the case that homogeneity damages the quality of psychological science. The fourth section reviews evidence that researchers' ideological beliefs can influence virtually every stage of the research process, from the selection of topics through the questions asked, the methods used, and the interpretation of findings.

Finally, in the fifth section we offer recommendations to remedy the lack of ideological diversity, and to improve psychological science. Examples include adopting anti-discrimination resolutions; recruiting non-liberal graduate students; seeking scholars whose research contests liberal narratives to serve on the scientific and governing boards of major organizations such as APA and APS; studying barriers to the success of non-liberals; raising consciousness about political bias; stamping out sneering "locker room talk" about conservatives; and encouraging adversarial collaboration.

Before we proceed, we note for the curious reader that the collaborators on this article include one liberal, one centrist, two libertarians, one whose politics defy a simple left/right categorization, and one neo-positivist contrarian who favors a don't-ask-don't-tell policy in which scholarship should be judged solely on its merits. None of us identifies as conservative.

1) When and Why is Diversity Good?

There are many reasons to believe that ideological diversity is a good thing in the scientific marketplace for ideas. Homogeneous intellectual environments are vulnerable to the blinding and binding forces of homogeneity. "Blinding" means that shared ideological worldviews can lead homogenous communities to overlook important questions and miss or misunderstand data that is right under their noses. "Binding" means that ideologically homogenous communities function as tribal-moral communities (Haidt, 2012) that circle the wagons to defend values they hold sacred -- sometimes, at the expense of science. Evidence

suggesting that ideological homogeneity is problematic and that intellectual diversity is good includes research on the confirmation bias, minority influence, and the generation of novel ideas.

Confirmation Bias

People tend to search for evidence to support their existing beliefs, but not for disconfirming evidence, a problem that seems pervasive in the conduct of science (Ioannidis, 2012). No one has yet found a long-term cure for the confirmation bias. Courses in “critical thinking” temporarily suppress but do not remove it (Lilienfeld, Ammirati, & Landfield, 2009).

Far more effective than training individuals to overcome their own biases is to put them together with other individuals who do not share the same biases. People are quite good at finding flaws in other people’s reasoning, and at adducing evidence counter to other people’s conclusions (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). People are so good at playing “lawyer” that reasoning itself has recently been described as serving primarily an “argumentative function” (Sperber et al., 2010). Our capacity to reason often serves social functions, such as defending ourselves in the court of public opinion, rather than serving primarily epistemic functions, such as finding the truth (Haidt, 2012; Tetlock, 2002).

Confirmation bias can be expected to be much more powerful when people confront morally valenced questions. Moral questions trigger moral emotions and concerns about group identity and membership (Haidt, 2001; 2012). This means that in an ideologically homogeneous community, the same confirmation bias on many issues will be widely shared. In such cases, we can expect that little work will be done to disconfirm shared assumptions and ideologically pleasing findings.

One of the present authors (Jussim) had a recent experience as a reviewer that epitomizes this situation. The submitted paper failed to find evidence of racial prejudice, a finding Jussim found to be both surprising and extremely important. The other reviewer recommended rejection, in part, because the failure to find evidence of racial prejudice indicated (to the reviewer) that the methodology was not valid. This criticism renders the belief in pervasive prejudice as closer to dogma than to science. It implies that failure to find prejudice constitutes not a lack of bigotry but a methodological failure sufficiently severe to preclude publication. If so, the “prejudice” hypothesis ceases to be capable of disconfirmation and, as such, is precluded from the realm of science. If this view is widespread, then many demonstrations of unprejudiced behavior will be censored out of the scientific literature, leading to a “science” that exaggerates the power and pervasiveness of prejudice.

Whether a research community is on the right or the left, if it is ideologically homogeneous, we can expect that it will frequently reach broad agreement about assumptions that others do not share and about conclusions that are unjustified by logic, science, or data. And intelligence offers no immunity from the confirmation bias. IQ is correlated with the number of reasons people find for their own side in an argument; it is not correlated with the (much lower) number of reasons people find to support the other side (Perkins, Farady & Bushey, 1991). The natural tendency for individuals in an ideologically homogeneous group is to accept supporting

evidence at face value, and to seek out disconfirmation or alternative hypotheses. This may cause few problems for communities whose goal is social cohesion (e.g., a religious or activist movement), but it is devastating for communities whose goal is to reach valid conclusions, such as legal and scientific communities. In fact, overcoming confirmation bias is a key part of the rationale for our adversarial justice system, which assumes that having adversarial lawyers represent each side will do a better job of uncovering pertinent evidence than a system in which only one side (e.g., the judge or police) is responsible for seeking the pertinent evidence.

The scientific community attempts to protect itself from confirmation bias, in part, through the peer review process. This process, however, offers little protection when nearly all members of the community share biases and blind spots, and favor the same conclusions on politically charged topics.

There is reason to believe that social science is especially vulnerable to confirmation bias. Published research findings are more likely to be false when there is greater flexibility in research designs and in the operationalization of variables (Ioannidis, 2005), in part because it is quite easy for social scientists to tweak methods and analyses to obtain statistically significant support for false hypotheses (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). One functional benefit of diversity, therefore, is to reduce the impact of such confirmation biases by virtue of including scientists who do not share the same value, interests, or commitments (Nickerson, 1998).

Minority Influence

Research on minority influence has focused on the processes by which minorities can undermine or improve majority members' thinking (e.g., Crano, 2012; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980). Specifically, two fundamental processes distinguish majority from minority influence (Crisp & Turner, 2011; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980). Majorities influence decision-making by producing conformity pressure to fit in. This does little to enhance judgmental depth or quality, but much to create cohesion and community. It also risks creating the types of groupthink that, in other contexts, is justifiably a target of criticism by social psychologists (Fiske, Harris, & Cuddy, 2004).

In contrast to the conformity pressures created by homogeneous majorities, dissenting minorities often create discord. Discord in science is probably highly functional. It motivates majority members to think more deeply about the issues at stake. The deeper thought produced by dissent can lead to higher-quality group decisions overall (Crisp & Turner, 2011; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980; Nemeth, 1995; Nemeth, Brown & Rogers, 2001). In scientific contexts, either the evidence and/or logic of the minority is so powerful and persuasive that it wins the majority, or, even if a majority view was right all along, by withstanding a forceful minority attempt at falsification, the validity and credibility of the majority is greatly strengthened (Popper, 1959/1968).

These processes reveal ways in which dissent is likely to improve the thinking of an ideologically homogeneous group. Even in the absurd case in which conservative ideas are *always* wrong and liberal ideas are *always* right, the presence of a few conservative social

psychologists who felt safe enough to voice their dissent would probably improve the thinking and research of the liberal majority. If conservative ideas are occasionally right, then the benefits of having a few conservatives would be even greater.

A dissenting minority also undermines the strength of social norms that, although perhaps useful in other contexts, are dysfunctional in scientific contexts. Adherence to social norms may create taboos and potential self-censorship that undermine academic freedom and quality. When certain ideas are shunned, many scholars—particularly young ones—will avoid those topics to avoid upsetting their peers. When the gatekeepers of prestigious publication outlets, symposia, or grant opportunities have made public proclamations that embrace a liberal worldview and reject ideas challenging that worldview (see Jussim, 2012a for numerous examples), scholars working in those shunned areas may give up on seeking those opportunities. A scientific community should be vigilant against normative pressures to conform to a particular political worldview. Otherwise, that community risks sacrificing the validity of its science for the sake of advancing a political agenda (for numerous examples, see Eagly, 1995; Jussim, 2012a; Redding, 2001).

Idea generation

Science is an enterprise dedicated to asking questions and answering them systematically. The more questions or ideas we can explore, the richer and more relevant social psychology will be. A more diverse community of researchers will generate more important ideas and research programs. This intuition is borne out by brainstorming studies where ethnic diversity in small groups can yield higher-quality ideas (McLeod, Lobel, & Cox, 1996). In that case, participants' ethnic diversity was a proxy for diverse experiences and international cultural insights that proved fruitful in the idea-generation task.

Similarly, groups perform better than individuals on *intellective* tasks (where there is a demonstrably correct answer), and this performance gap often hinges on the presence of just one member who knows the correct solution (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). Extrapolating to the scale of a scientific community, a small team or even a single researcher with a novel insight can often set off a cascade of high-impact research (consider, e.g., Festinger and dissonance, Bandura and modeling, or Kahneman & Tversky and errors and biases). The more diverse perspectives we have in the field, the more progress we will make in explaining a wide range of human behavior.

The value of diverse perspectives becomes especially clear when we consider the fruits of cultural psychology. Researchers from different backgrounds will sometimes choose different problems to study, and they will approach existing questions in a different way. Indeed, this fact was often cited as a reason for introducing gender diversity into the previously nearly all-male field of psychology (Gilligan, 1981). Research in cultural psychology shows that cross-national differences also run deep, including a variety of social-cognitive and even perceptual processes (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Nisbett 2003). Would it therefore be beneficial—from a purely functional perspective—for social psychology to draw in more non-Western researchers? We assume that most social psychologists join us in saying yes.

Such functional benefits should similarly flow from ideological diversity. The left-right division in the United States is quite large on many matters of interest to social psychologists (e.g., morality, politics, and racial and gender attitudes). Conservatives, for example, tend to rely on a broader set of moral foundations than do liberals (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009); they are more likely to emphasize equality of opportunity over equality of result (Mitchell & Tetlock, 2009); and they are more likely to emphasize the role of individual agency, merit, and responsibility for life outcomes (e.g., Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012; Skitka & Tetlock, 1992). Social psychology would likely be enhanced by an influx of research on topics related to individual agency (e.g., resilience, ambition, the power of the person to overcome and even create their own situations, etc.), merit (social and personality processes affecting competencies), and the strengths (rather than flaws) of social judgment.

Summary

Diversity can improve the thinking of groups. It improves the quality of judgment and choice, it can undermine taboos, and it can increase the number of good ideas. The key to such improvement is the presence of individuals who bring to the group novel ideas and questions, challenge group assumptions, and help overcome confirmation bias. If these ingredients make diversity good for science then ideological diversity should be among the most beneficial forms of diversity.

Once upon a time, psychology was dominated by behaviorists, who shared a limited and limiting set of assumptions about what constituted psychology. They also held nearly all outlets for professional advancement and scientific communication, and they created a hostile climate toward what we would now recognize as more cognitively-oriented psychologists. The stronghold of behaviorism before the Cognitive Revolution was described by George Miller: “The power, the honors, the authority, the textbooks, the money, everything in psychology was owned by the behavioristic school . . . those of us who wanted to be scientific psychologists couldn’t really oppose it. You just wouldn’t get a job” (quoted in Baars, 1986, p. 203). Yet these differing perspectives and dissenting voices -- often dismissed, denigrated, ignored, and relegated to second class positions in their day-- were crucial for progress in psychology.

II) Do We Have Ideological Diversity?

Ideological Homogeneity in the Social Sciences

Professors in the social sciences are currently extraordinarily homogeneous in political outlook.² Only 5-8% of social science professors identify as conservatives, whereas 58-66% identify as liberals (Gross & Simmons, 2007; Rothman & Lichter, 2008). Self-identified Democrats outnumber Republicans by ratios of roughly 8 to 1, or more (Gross & Simmons, 2007; Klein & Stern, 2009; Rothman & Lichter, 2009).

Ideological Homogeneity in Psychology

Psychology is somewhat less ideologically diverse than the social sciences in general. Among academic psychologists, the ratio of Democrats to Republicans has risen over the years from 3.4 to 1 in 1968, to 9:1 in 1999, and to 11:1 in 2006 (Gross & Simmons, 2007; McClintock, Spaulding, & Turner 1965; Rothman & Lichter, 2008). Moreover, 84% of psychologists identify as liberal, while only 8% identify as conservative (Gross & Simmons, 2007).

As Figure 1 shows, the field has become steadily more Democratic over the last 90 years. The period 1924 to 1956 presents (in blue) the recollections of McClintock et al's (1965) respondents of whom they voted for in presidential elections. In 1960, 1999, and 2006, marked with red in the figure, the data instead presents party preferences from the three different surveys over time (Gross and Simmons 2007; McClintock et al 1965; Rothman et al. 2005). Because the surveys used different methods of measurement and sampling, and because the ideological composition of the parties has varied over time, the data are not strictly comparable. Nonetheless, the overall upward trend is unmistakable.

Ideological Homogeneity in Social Psychology

Psychology is a diverse discipline, with many subfields. The subfield that deals most directly with ideologically controversial topics, and is thus most in need of ideological diversity, is arguably social psychology. Recently, Inbar and Lammers (2012) surveyed social and personality psychologists about their political attitudes by sending an email solicitation to the main discussion list of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology. The survey distinguished between political attitudes overall and in three distinct domains (social, economic, and foreign policy issues). Because the membership was international, the survey clarified that "liberal" meant "left/progressive" and conservative meant "right/traditionalist." With regard to their overall attitudes, 85 percent of social psychologists reported being liberal, 9 percent moderate, and 6 percent conservative. This striking lack of political diversity was found in the domain most relevant to social psychological research: on social issues, over 90 percent of the field described itself as liberal, and only 4 percent as conservative.

Somewhat more diversity was found when participants described themselves on "economic" issues (17.9% conservative) and "foreign policy" matters (10.3% conservative). But the moral issues that most intensely bind the American liberal community together these days are social issues, such as gay marriage and abortion, more than economic issues such as tax rates. A social psychologist can say "I am socially liberal but fiscally conservative," and not expect to lose friends. What is not acceptable is to say "I am against gay marriage" or "I am pro-life," or, most critically, "I am a conservative." We therefore focus primarily on the overall self-identification variable in the Inbar and Lammers dataset.

Inbar and Lammers shared their dataset with us, and we looked more closely at the distribution by age and status. Inbar & Lammers' data confirms the trend shown in Figure 1. In fact, among the 71 respondents who identified as current graduate students, there was just one conservative. This contrasts with 6 out of 82 (7%) for the tenured faculty members. This near-

total absence of young conservatives in the pipeline suggests that the trend of increasing homogeneity shown in Figure 1 will continue, and the threats to good science that we identify in this paper risk becoming more severe with each passing decade.

III) Why So Few Non-Liberals in Psychology?

The question of *why* non-liberals are so underrepresented in the social sciences is complex (Klein & Stern, 2005), and the evidence does not point to a single answer. To organize the various explanations put forward, we pose a parallel question that is now of intense interest: why are women so under-represented in STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics)? The five major classes of explanation include: differences in ability, differences in interest, lack of appeal of a field seemingly devoted to liberals and liberal causes, hostile climate, and overt discrimination. We review the evidence for each of these explanations for the severe under-representation of conservatives in social psychology, and conclude that the low and declining level of ideological diversity is likely caused by a combination of factors.

1) Differences in Ability

Just as some have suggested that the gender gap in STEM participation is related to men's superior spatial reasoning abilities (Voyer, Voyer, & Bryden, 1995), or to the greater number of males at the extremes of math ability (Hedges & Nowell, 1995; Summers, 2005), some have claimed that liberals are simply more intelligent than conservatives and therefore better able to obtain doctorates and faculty positions (e.g., Gilbert, 2011). The evidence on the relationship between intelligence and political ideology is mixed. College performance does not seem to distinguish liberals from conservatives: they earn equivalent grades across a number of academic disciplines (Kemmelmeier, Danielson, & Basten, 2005; Woessner & Kelly-Woessner, 2009). Although some studies have found a modest negative correlation between IQ and conservatism (Heaven, Ciarrochi & Leeson, 2011; Hodson & Busseri, 2012), others have found no differences, or even a curvilinear relationship (Kemmelmeier, 2008).

The observed relationship between intelligence and conservatism largely depends on how conservatism is operationalized (Kemmelmeier, 2008). Whereas *social* conservatism correlates with lower cognitive ability test scores, *free-market conservatism* correlates with *higher* scores (Kemmelmeier, 2008). This largely explains why both Heaven et al (2011) and Hodson and Busseri (2012) found a negative correlation between IQ and "conservatism" as operationalized by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), which is more strongly related to social conservatism than to economic conservatism (van Hiel et al, 2004).

Kemmelmeier's (2008) research is particularly useful for putting the "conservatives are not smart enough" explanation into context. The liberal/conservative differences in SAT Math, SAT Verbal, and ACT scores reported by Kemmelmeier were generally *smaller* than those observed for race or sex differences. If differences in test scores cannot explain the underrepresentation of women and African Americans in STEM fields, then even smaller

differences in test scores between liberals and conservatives cannot logically be invoked to explain or justify the larger degree of underrepresentation of conservatives in the social sciences.

The lower-intelligence hypothesis also cannot account for the increasing leftward drift of the social sciences over the last several decades, nor can it account for the wide variability in ideology across academic disciplines. For example, one third to one half of faculty in engineering, economics, chemistry, and physics are non-liberals (Rothman, Licther, & Nevitte, 2005). If the lower-intelligence hypothesis held true, one would predict that the GRE scores in psychology would be higher than those in engineering, economics, chemistry, and physics, which is not the case (e.g., Templer & Tomeo, 2002).

2) *Differences in Interest*

It has been argued that much of the underrepresentation of women in STEM fields is due to self-selection based on differences in interest (e.g., Pinker, 2003). According to this view, even when men and women are matched for their performance on aptitude tests, female students, on average, are simply less interested than men in STEM majors and STEM occupations.

Self-selection of this sort may explain some of the underrepresentation of non-liberals in social psychology. The Big-5 trait that correlates most strongly with political liberalism is openness to experience ($r = .32$ in Jost et al.'s 2003 meta-analysis), and people high in that trait are more likely to pursue careers that will let them indulge their curiosity and desire to learn, such as a career in the academy (McCrae, 1996). An academic career requires a Ph.D., and liberals enter (and leave) college more interested in pursuing doctorates than do conservatives (Woessner & Kelly-Woessner, 2009). Furthermore, the personal and intellectual priorities of liberals may predispose them to an academic career: relative to conservatives, they are less interested in financial success, and more interested in writing original works and making a theoretical contribution to science (Woessner & Kelly-Woessner, 2009).

Conservatives outnumber liberals in the United States by two to one (roughly 40% to 21%; Saad, 2012). But if liberals are moderately higher on traits such as openness to experience, then in a perfectly free and fair market with no discrimination or other obstacles to entry, we would not expect social psychologists to be 67% conservative, just as—if it turns out that there are gender differences in interest in science—we would not expect STEM fields to be 50% female. We would expect some degree of under-representation in both cases. But can a trait that correlates at $r = .32$ with ideology explain how we go from a liberal:conservative ratio of 1:2 in the general population to 12:1 or higher in social psychology? There must be other processes at work.

3) *Birds of a Feather*

Even if there were no hostility to conservatives, there could still be forces pushing them away from social psychology. For example, once a field becomes justifiably seen as stereotypically liberal (or conservative), people who don't fit the stereotype may become less inclined to enter, just as men become reluctant to enter stereotypically female professions, and

women might be less interested in entering STEM fields because they are seen as male fields. Similarity-attraction and dissimilarity-repulsion are well-established psychological phenomena (Byrne, 1971; Rosenbaum, 1986), so that when a field becomes nearly uniform in its leftwing politics, it may appear to become a club for liberals. Some have argued that this is the primary explanation for the underrepresentation of conservatives in the academy (Gross & Fosse, 2012; Gross, 2013; but see the critique by Buturovic and Klein (2010) for an alternative explanation).

A related possibility is that conservatives may be uninterested in—or even put off by—the topics generally studied by social psychologists. Many issues that social psychologists study (e.g., racism, sexism, and inequality) seem to reflect scientific agendas closely linked to liberal political agendas. Indeed, many social psychologists are quite explicit in declaring that the opportunity to pursue leftwing agendas was one of the main motivations for entering the field (MacCoun, 1998; Unger, 2011). The abundance of topics that appeal to liberals (such as those emphasizing the moral and intellectual superiority of liberals, the power of prejudice, or the evils of authority) and the relative paucity of topics likely to appeal to conservatives (the value of authority and order, the success of meritocratic norms and processes, or the importance of personal responsibility) may, even in the absence of hostility, strike conservatives as an unappealing professional domain.

This situation risks becoming a self-sustaining cycle: 1. Regardless of the reasons, social psychologists are mostly liberal, which, by itself, creates the impression that social psychology is a club for liberals. 2. This liberal group then disproportionately focuses on questions that are central to liberal moral concerns. 3. Conservatives become even more likely to self-select away from the field. 4. This leads the field to become even more liberal, and leads to its research portfolio becoming even more unbalanced.

4) Hostile Climate

Do STEM disciplines create a hostile climate for female scientists? This is a serious charge, leveled by some critics (Settles, Cortina, Steward, & Maley, 2007). If the underrepresentation of women is due in part to self-selection based on an accurate perception among women that they are not welcome, or even disrespected merely for being female, then the leaders of those fields face a strong moral obligation to take action. Leaving aside the moral obligation, a field shoots itself in the foot when it repels half of the potential talent pool. Has social psychology created a hostile climate for non-liberals? Might some of the self-selection discussed in the previous section be amplified by an accurate perception among non-liberals that they are not welcome?

Consider some recent conclusions reached by social psychologists about political conservatives: compared to liberals, they are less intelligent (Hodson & Busseri, 2012), less complex (Jost et al., 2003), and more rigid, dogmatic, and inflexible (Jost et al., 2003). Their lower IQ helps to explain their racism and sexism (Deary, Batty, & Gale, 2008). They endorse inequality (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003), and this is the reason that they are happier than liberals (Napier & Jost, 2008). They are hyper-responsive to threatening stimuli

(Oxley et al., 2008), and they adopt their political beliefs in part to calm their excessive fearfulness (Jost et al, 2003). Even when results could just as easily be spun to make liberals look bad (e.g., they are wishy-washy unhappy people so mindlessly focused on equality of outcomes that they ignore their own close relationships and the importance of personal responsibility for personal success) there is nobody around to do such spinning. Thus, studies of differences are usually cast—and reported in the press--as studies of conservative character defects.

As undergraduates encounter the research literature in their social psychology classes, might they pick up cues that the field regards conservatism as a bad thing, and conservatives as bad people? And if they do go on to graduate school, and begin to take part in conferences, classes, and social events in which everyone else is a politically liberal -- what then? We ourselves have often heard jokes and disparaging comments made by social psychologists about conservatives, not just in informal settings but sometimes from the podium at conferences and lectures. The few conservatives who have enrolled in graduate programs hear these comments too, and some of them have written to Haidt to describe the hostility and ridicule that has forced them to stay “in the closet” about their political beliefs (see Haidt, 2011). It would be a major scandal if professors told disparaging jokes about women, African Americans, or Muslims during a public lecture, yet public displays of contempt for conservatives are often considered socially acceptable.

Evidence of hostile climate is not just anecdotal. Inbar and Lammers (2012) asked respondents: “Do you feel that there is a hostile climate towards your political beliefs in your field?” Out of 17 conservatives, 14 (82%) said yes (by selecting a response at or above the midpoint of the scale, where the midpoint was labeled “somewhat” and the top point “very much”). Seven of those fourteen selected “very much.” In contrast, out of 266 liberals, only 18 (7%) said yes, and only two of those 18 said “very much.”

One surprise in Inbar & Lammer's (2012) data came from the moderates. Out of the 25 respondents who self-described as “moderate,” 18 (72%) said yes, and one selected “very much” in response to the perceived hostile climate question. This suggests that the hostile climate may not only affect conservatives. It may adversely affect anyone who is not liberal. It may repel anyone whose values or research might threaten the prevailing moral consensus.

5) Discrimination

The most disturbing possible cause of the underrepresentation of women in STEM fields would be direct discrimination. Evidence that male professors were less likely to hire, publish, or award grants to qualified female applicants – even if that bias occurred entirely unconsciously—could be grounds for a successful lawsuit and many years of federal oversight of hiring practices in STEM fields. Might there be direct discrimination in social psychology against conservatives?

The idea is plausible. When people are evaluating others and there is ambiguity about the relevant criteria and weak accountability systems for monitoring bias, the prejudices of evaluators can creep in. Such discrimination has been shown to occur on the basis of race (Pager, 2003) and gender (Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoll, Graham, & Handelsman, 2012).

It also occurs on the basis of ideology. When judging college admissions folders, undergraduate partisans weighed more heavily whichever feature (grades or recommendations) let them select the applicant who shared their ideology (Munro, Lasane, and Leary, 2010). It is not just undergraduate partisans who discriminate. Abramowitz, Gomes, & Abramowitz (1975) asked liberal and non-liberal research psychologists to rate the suitability of a manuscript for publication. The manuscript purported to demonstrate that a group of leftist political activists were mentally healthier—or less healthy—than a comparison group of non-activists. When the activists were said to be healthier, liberal reviewers rated the manuscript as more publishable, and the statistical analyses as more adequate, compared to an otherwise identical manuscript that reported activists to be less mentally healthy.

A similar pattern has occurred among Internal Review Boards. Ceci, Peters, and Plotkin (1985) submitted research proposals to 150 Internal Review Boards. The proposals described research projects on either "reverse discrimination" or conventional discrimination, but they were otherwise identical. The "reverse discrimination" proposals were approved less often than the conventional discrimination proposals.

Some of the strongest evidence suggesting direct discrimination was reported by Inbar and Lammers (2012). They asked: "If two job candidates (with equal qualifications) were to apply for an opening in your department, and you knew that one was politically quite conservative, do you think you would-be inclined to vote for the more liberal one?" Of the 237 liberals, only 42 (17%) chose the lowest scale point, "not at all." In other words, 83% *admitted that they would be at least a little bit prejudiced against a conservative candidate*, and 43% chose the midpoint ("somewhat") or above. Most moderates (67%) and conservatives (83%) chose the lowest scale point.

Inbar & Lammers (2012) assessed explicit willingness to discriminate in other ways as well, all of which told the same story. When reviewing a grant, 82% of liberals admitted at least a trace of bias, and 27% chose "somewhat" or above. When reviewing a paper, 78% admitted at least a trace of bias, and 21% chose "somewhat" or above. When inviting participants to a symposium, 56% of liberals admit to at least a trace of bias, and 15% chose "somewhat" or above.

These numbers are almost certainly lower bound estimates of the true discrimination faced by conservative social psychologists. It seems likely that at least some of the 237 liberal respondents to the survey made some effort to conceal their willingness to discriminate. And these very high numbers reflect only *conscious* willingness to discriminate. Even people who explicitly ascribe to egalitarian views may simultaneously hold inegalitarian implicit beliefs (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000).

One of the authors (Duarte) can attest to numerous experiences of discrimination on the basis of (perceived) political orientation. One such experience occurred when he applied to Ph.D. programs in Social Psychology and participated in a phone interview with a faculty member from one program. During the call, the faculty member questioned Mr. Duarte about an old blog post in which he had criticized former President Jimmy Carter's statements on Palestinian

terrorism. The faculty member claimed that the other faculty members in the program had a problem with the post, and asked if he really felt so strongly about Mr. Carter. He was subsequently denied admission to this program, while being admitted to a host of more selective programs. A job interview that steers toward an applicant's political views is wildly inappropriate by normal professional and legal standards. That a prospective graduate student was apparently subjected to a political litmus test (and so *openly*) is a clear illustration of the direct discrimination that Inbar and Lammers' participants endorsed.

Summary

In summary, several factors explain the underrepresentation of conservatives in social psychology. The explanation that liberals are smarter than conservatives is the weakest of all purported factors, for the effect size is quite small and is not found in all studies. Self-selection is surely a contributor to conservative underrepresentation, particularly when small differences in average personality are amplified by preferences to join clubs in which one fits the stereotype.

Yet these relatively innocent explanations are unlikely to be sufficient, both because of the enormous and growing magnitude of the underrepresentation, and because of the direct evidence that more disturbing processes are at work. Conservatives perceive social psychology to be a hostile field, and they are correct in their perception. Social psychologists do indeed express willingness to discriminate against conservatives and research that supports conservative positions. Together, this suggests the existence of a self-reinforcing cycle of ideological purification. Self-selection plays more and more of a role as social psychology becomes more and more liberal, and more and more hostile to conservatives.

To return to the under-representation of women in STEM fields: Suppose that a major investigation commissioned by the National Science Foundation reached the following four conclusions:

- 1) Women are slightly less likely than men to score in the upper reaches of mathematical aptitude.
- 2) Women are less likely to express an interest in STEM fields.
- 3) 82% of women in STEM fields perceive a climate hostile.
- 4) 80% of men in STEM fields admit that they would discriminate against women, at least to a small degree, at all major steps of a woman's career.

Suppose the report is released, and the men in these fields ignore points three and four. They just keep saying that women are not smart enough or interested enough to succeed in math, physics, and other such fields. They say that women are more interested in being full-time mothers than pursuing scientific careers. What would you think of these men? That is, essentially, the situation of social psychology today with regard to its few conservatives. When faced with clear evidence of massive under-representation of conservatives, plus evidence of ideological discrimination in controlled experiments, plus self-reports of hostile climate from conservatives, plus self-reports of discrimination from liberals, it seems that no more data are

needed. The situation is clear, and it is clearly one in which social psychology as a field is in violation of its own values regarding discrimination, respect for individuals, valuing diversity, and the treatment of vulnerable people in situations of low power.

IV) How Ideological Homogeneity Harms Our Science

So far, we have made four key points: 1) diversity can improve the performance of groups, and is likely to improve the performance of social psychologists as a group; 2) Diversity of *perspective*, or intellectual diversity, is at least as valuable as bio-demographic diversity in an intellectual community; 3) Social psychology lacks a major sub-type of intellectual diversity-- ideological diversity; and 4) A combination of factors, including self-selection, hostile climate, and direct discrimination has led to a self-reinforcing cycle that has largely purged conservatives (and perhaps moderates as well), from social psychology.

We now turn to our primary concern—that the ideological homogeneity of social psychology harms the science of social psychology. We start by noting that academic fields often become cohesive moral communities, creating a shared reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996) or moral matrix (Haidt, 2012) that guides and constrains the thinking of its members. The sociologist Christian Smith (2003) has studied such moral communities within the academy and has identified the moral narratives that link researchers’ conceptions of history to their conceptions of their research. The narrative he wrote for the community of liberal sociologists he calls the “liberal progress narrative:”

Once upon a time, the vast majority of human persons suffered in societies and social institutions that were unjust, unhealthy, repressive, and oppressive. These traditional societies were reprehensible because of their deep-rooted inequality, exploitation, and irrational traditionalism. . . . But the noble human aspiration for autonomy, equality, and prosperity struggled mightily against the forces of misery and oppression, and eventually succeeded in establishing modern, liberal, democratic... welfare societies. While modern social conditions hold the potential to maximize the individual freedom and pleasure of all, there is much work to be done to dismantle the powerful vestiges of inequality, exploitation, and repression. This struggle for the good society in which individuals are equal and free to pursue their self-defined happiness is the one mission truly worth dedicating one’s life to achieving. (Smith, 2003, p. 82)

Smith wrote this narrative for sociology, but we think it works well for social psychology too. When almost everyone in a community shares the same moral narrative, and when that narrative *identifies conservatives as the villains* (i.e., the people who dogmatically favor tradition and inequality; see Jost et al, 2003), then there will necessarily be hostility toward conservatives and conservative ideas. Such hostility distorts the marketplace of ideas. It drives out young people who would otherwise question prevailing assumptions, critique prevailing paradigms, and challenge the prevailing moral narrative.

Haidt (2012) proposes that a basic principle of moral psychology is that “morality binds and blinds.” It binds people together into a cohesive team, able to work together and trust each other while fighting other teams. However, it also makes it very difficult for members of the team to seek out—or even listen to—ideas or findings that are not compatible with the team’s shared moral narrative. If social psychology (like many other social sciences) has become an ideologically homogeneous community in which most researchers endorse the liberal progress narrative, then we can identify three risk points – places where the normal processes of scientific exploration and self-correction can be expected to break down:

1. Liberal values and assumptions are embedded in research questions, constructs, measures, and interpretations of data.
2. Liberal topics and theories are over-explored; non-liberal topics and theories are under-explored or suppressed.
3. Research findings are spun to cast liberals and liberal beliefs and values in favorable terms, and non-liberals and their beliefs and values in unfavorable terms.

1) Liberal Values and Assumptions are Embedded into Research Questions, Constructs, Measures, and Interpretations of Data

A hallmark of science is the generation of testable hypotheses. In order to test a hypothesis, we must be able to observe and measure the relevant constructs. For example, to test whether self-esteem predicts career success, we must be able to measure self-esteem and career success, and our measures must meet standards of validity. Normally, our concerns over construct validity revolve around “mono-operation” bias (Cook & Campbell, 1979), and the need to measure a construct using a variety of methods. However, the ideological homogeneity of social psychology has introduced an entirely different threat to the validity of our constructs. We sometimes *embed ideological value judgments* into research questions in ways that make those questions unanswerable, and render our published findings invalid (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock & Mitchell, 1993; Tetlock, 1994).

One common way we do this is by treating the tenets and value judgments of liberalism as objectively true. For example, Feygina, Jost and Goldsmith (2010) sought to explain the “denial of environmental realities” using system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Below are four constructs measured by the researchers in Study 1, with illustrative items in parentheses.

Construct 1: Denial of the possibility of an ecological crisis (“If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major environmental catastrophe” (reverse scored))

Construct 2: Denial of limits to growth (“The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them”)

Construct 3: Denial of the need to abide by the constraints of nature (“Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it”)

Construct 4: Denial of the danger of disrupting balance in nature (“The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations”)

These constructs are all structured as the “denial” of something. When psychologists use "denial" in this way, they cannot avoid the term’s psychoanalytic heritage. The implication is that anyone who attains a high score on these constructs is actively suppressing recognition of a painful truth. When it turns out that conservatives score high on the denial of reality, we then have a puzzle calling for a psychological explanation of their pathological thinking. No such explanation is needed for liberal beliefs about the environment, which might be labeled as “recognition of environmental realities.”

Yet are the four constructs truly objective realities? Are scientists in nearly perfect agreement that a catastrophe is coming soon, that we will soon run out of natural resources, that we will never be able to control nature, and that nature will soon lose its balance?? Is it a *fact* that we “need to abide by the constraints of nature?” In each case, we think not. These are ideological beliefs, not descriptive facts.

Consider the famous Simon-Ehrlich wager. In his book *The Population Bomb*, biologist Paul Ehrlich warned: “*The battle to feed all of humanity is over. In the 1970s hundreds of millions of people will starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now. At this late date nothing can prevent a substantial increase in the world death rate.*” Ehrlich predicted that overpopulation would lead to massive scarcity of food and other resources. In contrast, libertarian economist Julian Simon viewed human beings as the “ultimate resource,” not net consumption machines: more people would yield more productivity and innovation. When a commodity such as copper becomes scarce, its price rises, and people find innovative ways to replace it, such as using fiber optic cables rather than copper cables.

In 1980, Simon challenged Ehrlich to pick any five commodities that he expected to become more scarce—and therefore more expensive—as the global population rose. Ehrlich picked copper, chromium, nickel, tin, and tungsten. Ten years later, when the wager ended, Simon won. All five had dropped in price. (For more on positive environmental trends, see Ridley, 2010.)

The Simon-Ehrlich wager yielded support for the claim that “The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them.” The denial of that claim is not necessarily a sign of a dark and complicated underlying psychology. In fact, one could just as well ask why it is that some people are motivated to deny the adaptability, flexibility, and wealth-creating power of markets. In an alternate universe in which social psychology was dominated by conservatives and libertarians, we imagine that someone would publish a study on “the denial of economic realities,” or "the denial of the power of free market capitalism" both of which would paint rather unflattering portraits of liberals.

To take a second example, Son Hing, Bobocel, Zanna, and McBride (2007) found that people high in SDO were more likely to make unethical decisions, people high in RWA were more likely to go along with the unethical decisions of leaders, and that dyads consisting of high SDO leaders and high RWA followers made more unethical decisions than dyads with alternative arrangements (e.g., low SDO--low RWA dyads). Yet consider the decisions they defined as “unethical:” not formally taking a female colleague’s side in her sexual harassment complaint against her subordinate (given little information about the case), and placing your company’s well-being above unspecified harms to the environment attributed to its operations. Liberal values of feminism and environmentalism were embedded into the operationalization of ethics. In an alternate universe in which social psychology was dominated by conservatives and libertarians, someone could publish a study demonstrating that people low in SDO and RWA are more unethical because they are more willing to commit small acts of treason, disrespect for authority, and disregard for private property.

Embedding values into measures is bad for science no matter who does it. It is much more likely to happen – and to go unchallenged – in an ideologically homogeneous discipline.

2) Liberal topics and theories are over-explored; non-liberal topics and theories are under-explored or suppressed.

Since the enlightenment, scientists have thought of themselves as spreading light, pushing back the darkness. The metaphor is apt, but in an ideologically homogeneous field, a great many scientists shine their flashlights on a few ideologically significant parts of the terrain, while many regions go unexplored. Or—worse—some regions are roped off and young scientists are warned away from exploring them.

Stereotyping is among the features of the social landscape that have attracted the largest number of lanterns in the last four decades. It is vitally important not just for science but for society to understand why people hold and how they use stereotypes. Clearly there are many processes at work, yet the largest single cause, in terms of effect sizes and explanatory power, is rarely mentioned in review papers or undergraduate textbooks: stereotypes usually have some basis in the reality that people observe. Stereotype accuracy data has been trickling in since the beginning of social psychology (see Mackie, 1973 and Ottati & Lee, 1995 for historical reviews). Dozens of high quality studies have now demonstrated high levels of accuracy in racial, gender, occupational, academic, and other stereotypes (e.g., McCauley & Stitt, 1978; Swim, 1994; see Jussim, 2012a, Ryan, 2002 for reviews). Yet social psychologists have largely underplayed these studies, presumably because they conflict with a liberal worldview and might complicate longstanding liberal efforts to combat prejudice and discrimination. However, the reality of group differences across a variety of domains is not a reality that social psychologists should evade. If groups didn't differ, they wouldn't be groups. That people are able to detect group differences should not be surprising. There is an entire field dedicated to the study of group differences – called cultural psychology. Many of its findings are essentially accurate stereotypes.

3) *Research findings are spun to cast liberals and liberal beliefs and values in favorable terms, and non-liberals and their beliefs and values in unfavorable terms.*

A long-standing view in social-political psychology is that the right is more cognitively rigid and dogmatic than the left, a view Tetlock (1983) called the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis. Altemeyer (1988; 1996; 1998) argued that a consequence of this asymmetry in rigidity is that conservatives (particularly people high in right-wing authoritarianism [RWA]) are more prone to biased political judgment than people on the left. As an illustration of this phenomenon, Altemeyer (1996) found that people high in RWA were biased in favor of Christian over Muslim mandatory school prayer in public schools, whereas people low in RWA were opposed to mandatory school prayer regardless of the religious target group.

Recent evidence demonstrates that biased political judgments are not the exclusive, or even primary, province of the right; such biases occur on both the right and left, depending on judgment context. The ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM; Crawford, 2012) posits that biases depend on the perceived objectionableness of the judgment premise. The quality of one's reasoning is strongly influenced by whether one likes or hates the premises one is asked to work with. Reinterpreting Altemeyer's mandatory school prayer results described above, Crawford (2012) argued that the mandatory nature of school prayer was objectionable to people low in RWA, who value individual freedom. For them, mandatory school prayer is wrong, and they oppose it regardless of the target group. However, mandatory school prayer is not inherently objectionable to people high in RWA, who value conformity to traditional morals and values. For them, because this premise is not rejected out of hand, it then allows for bias in favor of Christians to emerge. Thus, according the IOPM, biases *on this issue* occurred only among those high in RWA and not among those low in RWA.

Importantly, Crawford (2012, Study 1) demonstrated that when an objectionable premise (i.e., mandatory school prayer) is replaced with an acceptable one (i.e., voluntary school prayer), people low in RWA were freed to be biased: specifically, they were more supportive of reserving space in schools for voluntary prayer for *Muslims* than for Christians. Thus, Altemeyer's results were not a product of ideological differences in rigidity (i.e., the rigidity-of-the-right), but rather differences in premise objectionableness. When people completely reject the premise of a question (mandatory school prayer, for liberals), they show no double standards, because the answer is a resounding, "No!" across the board, not because they are particularly flexible or non-dogmatic (indeed, one could interpret such a finding as itself reflecting inflexible and dogmatic beliefs). Several studies have shown that biases occur on both the political left and right under the conditions predicted by the IOPM (Crawford, 2012; Crawford & Xhambazi, in press), indicating that the appearance and disappearance of political bias has more to do with the questions asked than with the relative "rigidity" of liberals and conservatives.

Framing matters (Lakoff, 1996). The linguistic choices we make when describing a phenomenon will alter how our readers interpret our findings. What linguistic choices do social psychologists use to describe the psychology of political conservatism? In addition to the

“rigidity” cited above, we see terms like “intolerant of ambiguity” and “closed-minded” (Jost, et al, 2003). Each is pejorative and negatively valenced. As a turnabout test, imagine if these cognitive constructs were more strongly associated with political liberalism—how might they be labeled? Might we choose more value-neutral labels, such as “cognitive firmness,” or even more positively valenced ones, such as “preference for clarity” or “decisiveness?” Tetlock has shown how easy it is to find historical counter-examples to the tendency to treat integratively complex thought as morally and functionally superior to simple thought: abolitionists in antebellum America were less integratively complex than either free-soil Republicans or Buchanan Democrats (Tetlock et al., 1994)—and Winston Churchill adopted a less complex view of Nazi Germany than did Neville Chamberlain in debates over appeasement in the 1930’s (Tetlock & Tyler, 1996).

What language do we use when we describe the motivations of liberals? Consider the title of a paper (Johnson & Fujita, 2012) recently published in *Psychological Science*: “*Change We Can Believe In: Using Perceptions of Changeability to Promote System-Change Motives Over System-Justification Motives in Information Search.*” The title includes an explicit reference to President Obama’s election campaign, and an “intervention” of sorts to “promote” system change thinking, which, it is implied, is superior to system justification thinking. Consistent with the liberal progress narrative, conservatism is the enemy, but we scientists can use our research to defeat conservative thinking and make people more liberal.

Summary

In sum, an ideologically homogenous field is vulnerable to at least three problems which threaten the validity of its scientific findings. First, liberal values and assumptions get embedded into the theories and instruments used to study ideologically sensitive topics, yet because there are no conservatives to object during the peer review process, it often happens that nobody notices the embedding. Second, a shared moral narrative guides researchers to spread their attention unevenly over the landscape of possibilities for scientific exploration. Topics related to the liberal agenda of fighting racism and sexism recruit very large numbers of researchers, while other topics go unexplored. Low hanging fruit goes unpicked. Even worse—research findings on racism and sexism that are not politically correct are hard to publish, and even if published, they are likely to be widely ignored. Third, research findings are spun to cast non-liberals and their cognitive processes in unfavorable terms. Such spinning is not appropriate scientifically, and it exacerbates the very purification process that made the field ideologically homogeneous in the first place.

We are not calling for scientists to leave their values at the door. Rather, we are calling attention to what happens when the scientists all share the same moral values, and those values are partisan values, rather than values that are shared very widely in the surrounding culture (such as honesty).

Yet some psychologists embrace the partisan nature of the field, and call for more of it. In her Presidential address, APA president Melba Vasquez (2012, p. 345) recently called for the

promotion of “social justice” as a central goal of psychological science. She described the history of APA, which was “a firmly academic/scientific organization that was not significantly involved in social issues until its reorganization after World War II.” Vasquez then described the steps that various APA presidents and task forces took to make the pursuit of social justice into a core mission of the organization. In fact, one of APA’s five “core values” is now “social justice, diversity and inclusion.” In 1982, an APA board of Scientific Affairs objected to the embrace of social justice, arguing that APA should not be engaging in such social advocacy. But Vasquez quoted approvingly the response from social justice advocate Carolyn Payton, a plea that we “place our talents, expertise, and our energy in the service of our conscience as well as our discipline.” Such a statement could only be made by a person who perceived that psychology shared a single conscience – one based on Smith’s “liberal progress narrative,” which identifies conservatives as the villains of the story.

V) Ideological Homogeneity in Psychology: What Can We Do About It?

We recommend solutions in three sets. First, we discuss what psychologists can do as a field through our organizations and governance. Second, we discuss what we can do as researchers. Third, we discuss what we can do as teachers, mentors and members of admissions committees.

Organizational Responses

Diversity is a well-established value throughout the academy, and it enjoys broad support in psychology. The American Psychological Association has been very thoughtful about how to promote diversity within the field, and it issued a major report in 2005 (APA, 2005¹). Its task force focused on diversity with regard to race, gender, sexual orientation, and disability, but most of the specific recommendations made in the report are appropriate for promoting ideological diversity as well. Below are seven of the report’s 45 recommendations, which we have edited only slightly. We propose that APA, the Association for Psychological Science, and the Society for Personality and Social Psychology take the following steps:

1. Formulate and adopt an anti-discrimination policy resolution.
2. Implement a "climate study" regarding members' experiences, comfort/discomfort, and positive/negative attitudes/opinions/policies affecting or about members of ideologically diverse groups.
3. Collaborate on projects aimed at enhancing ideological diversity. For example, officers of the organizations might write columns for the *APA Monitor on Psychology* that explore ways in which ideological diversity intersects with other issues pertinent to practice, education, and science in psychology.
4. Expand the Publication and Communications Board’s database of non-liberal researchers who have expertise to serve as ad hoc reviewers or on editorial boards.

¹ The report can be found here: <http://www.apa.org/pi/oema/resources/taskforce-report.pdf>

5. Conduct a study of barriers/obstacles that non-liberal students face within training programs with the intent that these data subsequently be used in establishing formal suggestions for enabling the training of non-liberal students.
6. The chairpersons and/or presidents of the respective groups, divisions, and state psychological associations should formulate plans and policies to increase membership, activity, and representation of individuals from marginalized ideological groups in their respective organizations.
7. Each organization should develop strategies to encourage and support research training programs and research conferences to attract, retain, and graduate non-liberal doctoral students and early career professionals. Examples might include dissertation awards, travel funds for presentations and attendance at conferences, and other financial support targeted to graduate students.

Research responses

We recommend that researchers consider the following when planning, conducting, and writing up research:

1. *Scan for embedded value judgments.* Certain words—like legitimize, rationalize, justify, defend, trivialize, deny—carry value judgments. When research contrasts ideological groups, scan for pejorative terms, such as rigid (as opposed to firm) or symbolic racism or sexism (as opposed to conservative or traditionalist). Ask whether the stipulated mechanism or behavior could be described in a more neutral way. The mere presence of morally charged such words does not invalidate a hypothesis but it is a warning flag that facts and values are comingling. So it is crucial to clarify: Who is making the value judgment? The study of *participants'* value judgments is entirely appropriate; but if the value judgment is that of the researcher, the research question is likely invalid and the data may be meaningless.
2. *Support adversarial collaborations.* By encouraging people with different assumptions to collaborate, we can move toward a more complete science of human behavior (Diaconis, 1991). Adversarial collaboration is never easy (Mellers, Hertwig, & Kahneman, 2001), and when there are high legal or policy stakes, it becomes extraordinarily difficult (see the responses to the Tetlock & Mitchell [2009] offer of adversarial collaboration to identify the types of accountability pressures needed to check implicit prejudice in personnel decisions). Of course, such collaborations would be easier to initiate if there was a modicum of ideological diversity.
3. *Be alert to double standards.* Is the same finding viewed with hostility when it is interpretable as contesting liberal values (e.g., stereotype accuracy) but warmly welcomed if it is viewed as supporting those values (multicultural sensitivity; see Jussim, 2012a). Are methods that produce evidence of prejudice more publishable, noteworthy, or citation-worthy than when identical methods produce no evidence of prejudice? Practice turnabout thought experiments in which one asks oneself and one's colleagues how they would react to researchers using the same standards of evidence and proof to argue for the mirror-image ideological conclusion (Tetlock, 1994).

Social and departmental responses

Each one of us can take actions to mitigate the hostility of the current climate for non-liberals and invite more ideological diversity into social psychology. Specific actions include:

1. *Raise consciousness, raise awareness.* Acknowledge openly that low diversity is a problem in the field, and state openly that you would like this to change. Talk about the issue, especially in graduate courses, in faculty meetings about hiring and promotion, at symposia, colloquia, and conferences, and informally among faculty.
2. *Welcome feedback from non-liberals.* Invite non-liberal students in your classes to express their views and help you recognize and overcome your biases. Such students often express a sense of resignation about the futility of voicing their objections to liberal professors. Make it clear that you are trying to do better, and that you'd welcome emails or office visits – or even in-class challenges.
3. *Expand diversity statements.* Ask your department to modify the language on its website to include ideological diversity along with other kinds, in all statements encouraging members of underrepresented groups to apply for admission. Even if it proves difficult to get programs to make such statements, individual faculty can do so on their personal web pages.
4. *Stamp out political “locker room talk”* Certain ways of talking are common in settings in which men can be certain that no women will overhear them, such as in a men’s locker room, or a stereotypically male workplace. Such talk—in which women are discussed as sexual objects—is, at minimum, in poor taste. In workplaces it is often the basis for sexual harassment and employment discrimination claims. When psychologists make jokes and disparaging comments about conservatives while teaching classes, giving lectures, or simply socializing at parties where graduate students are present, it is political locker room talk, and it is a powerful deterrent to conservative students who might otherwise enter the field. We should object whenever we hear such talk as vociferously as if we heard sexist jokes and comments.
5. *Consider the use of affirmative action.* Affirmative action has many forms, and some of them—particularly giving explicit preferences to under-represented groups—are controversial. But if your department engages in affirmative action of any sort, then initiate a discussion about the reasons for it. Are the reasons solely moral reasons, to make up for past discrimination? Or are they functional reasons—because diversity can improve the quality of the education received by all students? Whether the reasons are moral or functional, you can make a strong case for including non-liberals within your affirmative action policy.

VI) Conclusion

In recent years, social psychology has faced many challenges, from the publication of Bem’s (2011) precognition paper in JPSP, to the Diederik Stapel debacle (Bhattacharjee, 2013) – challenges that have led many of us to reflect on the state of our field. Many of our most cited and notable findings are proving irreplicable (e.g., Baron, Albright, & Malloy, 1995; Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Shanks et al, 2013; see Jussim, 2012a for a review of

irreplicable findings on expectancy and stereotype bias and Jussim, 2012b for a general listing of failures to replicate studies in social psychology). The enduring influence of many irreplicable studies may also, at least sometimes, be a manifestation of ideological bias, especially when the original finding is consistent with liberal narratives and the failure is not (as with Pygmalion effects; see Jussim, 2012a). Simmons et al.'s (2011) paper on "false positive psychology" has challenged to the entire field of psychological science to reflect upon its research methods, and on the ways that we report our findings.

If scientific and moral motives are not enough to compel us to act, then we should consider financial motives as well. As the academy becomes increasingly liberal, we should not be surprised that Republican Senators and Congressmen want to cut off funding to fields they perceive to be overtly partisan, as happened recently with the Coburn Amendment (APA, 2013), which placed severe limits on political scientists' access to federal funding. If psychology does not act forcefully to remedy the situation and trends we have identified, our field could be next.

The core values of APA include "continual pursuit of excellence; knowledge and its application based upon methods of science; outstanding service to its members and to society; social justice, diversity and inclusion; ethical action in all that we do" (APA, 2010). If we are in fact discriminating against non-liberals, and if this discrimination damages our research, then we are betraying all five core values. Will we tolerate this betrayal and defend the status quo, or will we make the changes needed to realize our values and improve our science?




Figure 1: Political party sympathies expressed as ratios of Democrat:Republican of Professors of Psychology over time. Data for 1924-1960 is reported in McClintock et al. (1965), data for 1999 is reported in Rothman et al.(2009), data from 2006 is reported in Gross and Simmons(2007). Grey points are participants' recollections of who they voted for; red points are self-reported party identification at time of the survey.

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